Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md > `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed operations guide for setting up encrypted ToxTunnel remote access, with substantial safety guidance around scoping, validation, and persistence.
Install only if you intend to operate ToxTunnel remote access. Prefer version-pinned packages, review any service auto-start behavior before installing, keep generated rules limited to exact friend keys and host:port pairs, and avoid wide local binds unless you also add firewall controls.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> `scripts/diagnose.sh` checks all four; run it after writing a rules file.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
user@127.0.0.1 'whoami; uname -s'
# Web (status + large-file integrity):
curl --noproxy '*' -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:13080/
curl --noproxy '*' -s http://127.0.0.1:13080/big.bin | shasum -a 256 # compare to source
# Postgres (real query):
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.
**Silent-widening bugs (these are the dangerous ones):**
- **Unrecognised keys inside an allow/deny entry.** Only `host` and `ports` are
read; anything else is ignored with no warning.
- **A missing `ports` key**, which the engine reads as **all ports**. Together
with the previous item, a `port: 22` typo (singular) parses as "allow every
port on that host". Confirmed on v0.4.12: the daemon logs `Loaded access rules`
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.
**Silent-widening bugs (these are the dangerous ones):**
- **Unrecognised keys inside an allow/deny entry.** Only `host` and `ports` are
read; anything else is ignored with no warning.
- **A missing `ports` key**, which the engine reads as **all ports**. Together
with the previous item, a `port: 22` typo (singular) parses as "allow every
port on that host". Confirmed on v0.4.12: the daemon logs `Loaded access rules`
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
service.allow_client_daemon: true.
If the user explicitly wants this path, pin it to a release tag, download it,
let them read it, and only then run it. master is mutable: the | sudo sh
form executes whatever landed on that branch today, as root, unreviewed.
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
service.allow_client_daemon: true.
If the user explicitly wants this path, pin it to a release tag, download it,
let them read it, and only then run it. master is mutable: the | sudo sh
form executes whatever landed on that branch today, as root, unreviewed.
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
service.allow_client_daemon: true.
If the user explicitly wants this path, pin it to a release tag, download it,
let them read it, and only then run it. master is mutable: the | sudo sh
form executes whatever landed on that branch today, as root, unreviewed.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
user-customized config (only rewrites the freshly seeded server template
when switching to client).
Do not run the `curl … | sudo sh` or `irm … | iex` form on the user's behalf.
#### Unpinned `-latest` aliases (convenience only)
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
user-customized config (only rewrites the freshly seeded server template
when switching to client).
Do not run the `curl ... | sudo sh` or `irm ... | iex` form on the user's behalf.
#### Unpinned `-latest` aliases (convenience only)
This command chains download and privileged install using a mutable 'latest' alias. The chaining reduces opportunities for human verification and increases the chance that a compromised or unexpected artifact is installed immediately with root privileges.
ARCH=x86_64 # or aarch64 (Darwin: arm64 / x86_64)
BASE=https://github.com/agentx-icu/tox-tcp-tunnel/releases/latest/download
wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.deb" && sudo dpkg -i "toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.deb"
wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.rpm" && sudo rpm -i "toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.rpm"
wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Darwin-${ARCH}-latest.pkg" && sudo installer -pkg "toxtunnel-Darwin-${ARCH}-latest.pkg" -target /
# Windows: $BASE/toxtunnel-Windows-AMD64-latest.msi (ARM64 variant available), run as Administrator
The chained RPM example has the same issue: mutable remote content is fetched and then directly installed as root. In practice this weakens reviewability and increases supply-chain risk.
ARCH=x86_64 # or aarch64 (Darwin: arm64 / x86_64) BASE=https://github.com/agentx-icu/tox-tcp-tunnel/releases/latest/download wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.deb" && sudo dpkg -i "toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.deb" wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.rpm" && sudo rpm -i "toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.rpm" wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Darwin-${ARCH}-latest.pkg" && sudo installer -pkg "toxtunnel-Darwin-${ARCH}-latest.pkg" -target /
This macOS chained command fetches a mutable package and immediately runs the installer with elevated privileges. The convenience comes at the cost of reduced inspection and stronger dependence on upstream integrity.
BASE=https://github.com/agentx-icu/tox-tcp-tunnel/releases/latest/download wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.deb" && sudo dpkg -i "toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.deb" wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.rpm" && sudo rpm -i "toxtunnel-Linux-${ARCH}-latest.rpm" wget "$BASE/toxtunnel-Darwin-${ARCH}-latest.pkg" && sudo installer -pkg "toxtunnel-Darwin-${ARCH}-latest.pkg" -target /
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
#### Build from source (only if no package fits)
- macOS: `brew install libsodium && cd <project> && cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release && cmake --build build -j$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu) && sudo cp build/toxtunnel /usr/local/bin/`
- Linux (Debian/Ubuntu): `sudo apt install libsodium-dev build-essential cmake && cd <project> && cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release && cmake --build build -j$(nproc) && sudo cp build/toxtunnel /usr/local/bin/`
- Linux (Fedora/RHEL): `sudo dnf install libsodium-devel cmake gcc-c++ && ...`
- Windows: build with MSVC + vcpkg or MSYS2 (see `BUILDING.md`)
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
#### Build from source (only if no package fits)
- macOS: `brew install libsodium && cd <project> && cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release && cmake --build build -j$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu) && sudo cp build/toxtunnel /usr/local/bin/`
- Linux (Debian/Ubuntu): `sudo apt install libsodium-dev build-essential cmake && cd <project> && cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release && cmake --build build -j$(nproc) && sudo cp build/toxtunnel /usr/local/bin/`
- Linux (Fedora/RHEL): `sudo dnf install libsodium-devel cmake gcc-c++ && ...`
- Windows: build with MSVC + vcpkg or MSYS2 (see `BUILDING.md`)
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
#### Build from source (only if no package fits)
- macOS: `brew install libsodium && cd <project> && cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release && cmake --build build -j$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu) && sudo cp build/toxtunnel /usr/local/bin/`
- Linux (Debian/Ubuntu): `sudo apt install libsodium-dev build-essential cmake && cd <project> && cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release && cmake --build build -j$(nproc) && sudo cp build/toxtunnel /usr/local/bin/`
- Linux (Fedora/RHEL): `sudo dnf install libsodium-devel cmake gcc-c++ && ...`
- Windows: build with MSVC + vcpkg or MSYS2 (see `BUILDING.md`)
The skill clearly instructs the agent to generate commands, validate configs, and in Execute/Diagnose modes run shell commands, yet it declares no explicit tool scope or allowed-tools policy. In an agent platform, that mismatch increases the chance of overbroad shell access being granted implicitly, enabling unintended command execution beyond the minimum needed for this networking skill.
The skill includes detailed persistence setup and notes package-managed auto-registration/bootstrapping for launchd, systemd, and Windows SCM around a tool designed for remote network access. In this context, persistence is more sensitive because the software creates encrypted tunnels that could provide durable covert access if deployed without clear operator intent.
3. **Minimum privilege by default.** When generating rules.yaml, only allow the exact host:port combinations needed. Each friend gets their own rule entry with explicit 64-char hex public key.
4. **No friend wildcards.** The `friend` field in rules.yaml must be an exact 64-character hex public key. Never use `*` for friend identity.
5. **OS-aware.** Detect or ask the user's OS and tailor paths, commands, and service management:
- macOS (package): `binary: /usr/local/bin/toxtunnel`; example config at `/usr/local/share/toxtunnel/config.yaml.example`. The pkg postinstall **automatically** seeds `/usr/local/etc/toxtunnel/config.yaml` from the example, installs `com.toxtunnel.daemon.plist` into `/Library/LaunchDaemons/`, and runs `launchctl bootstrap`. The daemon then honours `service.allow_client_daemon` / `service.auto_start` and exits 0 cleanly when gated off.
- Linux (package): `binary: /usr/bin/toxtunnel`, `config: /etc/toxtunnel/config.yaml`, `data: /var/lib/toxtunnel`, service: `toxtunnel.service` (`Type=notify`, `RemainAfterExit=yes`). The postinst seeds the config from the example and runs `systemctl enable --now`. Server installs come up online; client installs idle (`active (exited)`) until the user fills in `client.server_id` and sets `service.allow_client_daemon: true`.
- Windows (package): `binary: C:\Program Files\ToxTunnel\bin\toxtunnel.exe`. **The MSI does NOT auto-register the SCM service** (the WiX patch is shelved in `cmake/Packaging.cmake` until the correct CPack-generated component Id is discovered). Workflow: user runs the MSI, creates `C:\ProgramData\ToxTunnel\config.yaml`, then registers the service explicitly: `& 'C:\Program Files\ToxTunnel\bin\toxtunnel.exe' install-windows-service -c 'C:\ProgramData\ToxTunnel\config.yaml'`, then `sc start ToxTunnel`. The repo's own `scripts/install.ps1` (in the tox-tcp-tunnel repository, not this skill's `scripts/`) does all of this automatically (download → install → seed config → start service) base
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The skill documents package post-install behavior that auto-enables and starts a daemon (systemctl enable --now / launchd bootstrap). Even though the skill later says not to enable persistence without explicit request, embedding auto-start assumptions in installation guidance can still normalize unattended persistence for a remote-access tunneling service.
4. **No friend wildcards.** The `friend` field in rules.yaml must be an exact 64-character hex public key. Never use `*` for friend identity.
5. **OS-aware.** Detect or ask the user's OS and tailor paths, commands, and service management:
- macOS (package): `binary: /usr/local/bin/toxtunnel`; example config at `/usr/local/share/toxtunnel/config.yaml.example`. The pkg postinstall **automatically** seeds `/usr/local/etc/toxtunnel/config.yaml` from the example, installs `com.toxtunnel.daemon.plist` into `/Library/LaunchDaemons/`, and runs `launchctl bootstrap`. The daemon then honours `service.allow_client_daemon` / `service.auto_start` and exits 0 cleanly when gated off.
- Linux (package): `binary: /usr/bin/toxtunnel`, `config: /etc/toxtunnel/config.yaml`, `data: /var/lib/toxtunnel`, service: `toxtunnel.service` (`Type=notify`, `RemainAfterExit=yes`). The postinst seeds the config from the example and runs `systemctl enable --now`. Server installs come up online; client installs idle (`active (exited)`) until the user fills in `client.server_id` and sets `service.allow_client_daemon: true`.
- Windows (package): `binary: C:\Program Files\ToxTunnel\bin\toxtunnel.exe`. **The MSI does NOT auto-register the SCM service** (the WiX patch is shelved in `cmake/Packaging.cmake` until the correct CPack-generated component Id is discovered). Workflow: user runs the MSI, creates `C:\ProgramData\ToxTunnel\config.yaml`, then registers the service explicitly: `& 'C:\Program Files\ToxTunnel\bin\toxtunnel.exe' install-windows-service -c 'C:\ProgramData\ToxTunnel\config.yaml'`, then `sc start ToxTunnel`. The repo's own `scripts/install.ps1` (in the tox-tcp-tunnel repository, not this skill's `scripts/`) does all of this automatically (download → install → seed config → start service) based on `-Mode` (or `TOXTUNNEL_MODE`) — download and review it before running, see General Rule 6. Removal: `uninstall-windows-service`. Upgrading in place (`msiexec /i new.msi /qn`) keeps the con
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