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Security audit

GigaMail

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is marked suspicious because scanners found access to Google Drive and a local spreadsheet that is not clearly disclosed for an email and calendar skill; the evidence does not establish malicious intent.

Consider whether you need a skill with Google Drive and local spreadsheet access in addition to email and calendar features. The scan was partial because several referenced paths were missing, and the other scanner reported no findings; this leaves incomplete evidence, not proof that the skill is safe. The verdict is suspicious, without a finding of clear malicious intent.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The supplied commands concern identity setup and adding a local pricing spreadsheet, rather than reading, searching, drafting, replying, or scheduling. Identity setup alone could be supporting configuration, but the specific local-file operation introduces an undeclared resource access without an evident connection to the stated workflow. The chunk does not establish whether the commands succeed, whether file contents are uploaded, or whether approval safeguards are bypassed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Email account setup, Calendar authentication, and the self-test align with the declared purpose. However, the Google login command explicitly includes Drive, a resource not covered by the description. The snippet does not show Drive file operations or approval enforcement, so it supports neither a claim of file access nor a finding that human approval is bypassed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The operational scope includes Google Drive file access and modification, although the manifest describes only email and calendar functionality.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest at L003 describes an email-and-calendar skill, but the operational tool inventory includes Google Drive listing and reading, plus drive_upload_file and drive_delete_file. General Drive file management expands access beyond that stated purpose; human approval for writes limits execution but does not resolve the scope mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 298)May include surrounding context.

md
the server's `env` block (see Setup step 3).
- Approvals the user grants "don't do anything" → same cause: server and
  console must share `GIGAMAIL_ROOT`.
- Approving from the CLI fails with "no consent backend" → that machine
  has no Windows Hello / Touch ID. On Linux the user sets a PIN with
  `gigamail approvals pin`; elsewhere they approve from the desktop
  console. `gigamail approvals check` shows which verification the machine