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Security audit

AdaptlyPost

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rated adaptlypost benign because the reported inbox prompt-injection entry point is aligned with the plugin’s purpose, with no successful misuse or malicious intent demonstrated.

Consider whether you are comfortable with inbox messages being shown to the agent as tool results. Before installing, review which other tools the agent can use and what approval controls apply, since the scanner did not verify host-level protections or whether injected messages could affect those tools.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

MCP06

Warning
Location
dist/index.js:1038
Finding

Untrusted Social Inbox Content Returned Directly to the Agent Model ## Remediation Suggestions 1. **Preserve source and trust information.** Explicitly label externally authored messages, comments, mentions, and reviews as untrusted content. State that instructions within them must not authorize actions or override the user’s request. Treat labeling as defense in depth, not a complete mitigation. 2. **Isolate inbox processing.** Summarize or classify external content in a restricted agent context without filesystem access, credential access, administration tools, or unrelated network capabilities. Pass only the necessary structured results to privileged workflows. 3. **Enforce authorization outside the model.** Require independent user authorization for sensitive actions derived from inbox content. Do not accept claims of approval contained in social messages. 4. **Maintain least privilege.** Use a Contributor token when drafting is sufficient, disable unnecessary administration tools, and retain exact-argument approval checks for public writes and uploads. 5. **Test adversarial content.** Add integration tests containing fabricated system notices, secret-disclosure requests, false approvals, and cross-tool instructions. Verify that the agent treats these as message data and that sensitive actions remain independently controlled. 6. **Verify host protections.** Assess the deployed OpenClaw tool-result handling and gateway policies before determining whether this entry point is exploitable in production.

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: plugin/dist/index.js:1038–1046
Vulnerability Type: Indirect Prompt Injection — Untrusted Tool Output
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet

javascript
            name: "adaptlypost_get_inbox_conversation",
            label: "AdaptlyPost: read a conversation",
            description: "Get one conversation with its messages: { conversation, messages } where each message has id, isOwn, text, hasAttachments and createdAt. Read it before drafting a reply. Fails with 404 inbox_item_not_found for an unknown id.",
            parameters: Type.Object({ conversation_id: ConversationId }),
            async execute(_toolCallId, params, signal) {
                const { conversation_id: conversationId } = params;
                return jsonResult(await callApi(cfg(), "GET", `/inbox/conversations/${encodeURIComponent(conversationId)}`, { signal }));
            },
        });

Technical Analysis

The conversation reader forwards the complete AdaptlyPost API response directly to jsonResult. This response includes message text controlled by external social-media users. The registered tool’s description encourages the agent to read this material before drafting a reply.

Consequently, attacker-authored instructions can enter the model’s context through otherwise legitimate tool results. The reviewed plugin provides no explicit untrusted-content labeling or restricted processing boundary for this material. JSON serialization preserves data structure but does not prevent the model from interpreting message text as instructions.

This establishes an indirect prompt-injection entry point. It does not establish that a particular model will obey the injected instructions. OpenClaw SDK internals, host-level isolation, and successful exploitation were not verified.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker sends a direct message to a social account connected to the workspace.
  2. The message contains instructions ...[truncated 1752 chars]

SkillSpector was not run because this plugin release contains no bundled skills.

Endor dependency reachability

Checked Nov 22, 2026 · 5:24 AM UTC

Scan failed: Endor analysis failed. Request a rescan to try again.