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Security audit

Acquaintance Recognition & Analysis Skill | 熟人识别分析技能

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill suspicious because scanners report undisclosed account creation and credential storage, unexpected analysis or uploads in export-only mode, and privacy concerns around facial imagery and video.

Consider the suspicious verdict and the reported privacy, account, and credential behavior before installing. In particular, determine whether you are comfortable with facial imagery or video being sent to an external service, and with automatic account creation and stored credentials. Scanning was partial because a local path-like reference could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/familiar_person_recognition_analysis.py
Finding

Upstream sender identity is discarded, causing different callers to share cloud credentials and report history

Content
View full analysis

Impact

A subsequent caller can retrieve reports generated under the shared fallback account by another caller, potentially exposing recognition results and report links. Analysis submissions are also attributed to that shared account. This does not establish a vulnerability in the remote service: the client supplies the shared account's valid credentials.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
Findings (19)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

Most of this file consists of ordinary supporting utilities, and the absence of face-recognition logic in a shared utility module does not itself establish a mismatch. However, the request wrapper can automatically provision a remote account and persist its identity and credentials when authentication is unavailable. This account-management behavior is not disclosed by the face-recognition description and is distinct from enrolling reference face images. The actual service domains are supplied by configuration and cannot be determined from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: "familiar-person-recognition-analysis"
description: "Identifies acquaintances in videos or images through face photo comparison. Supports database enrollment, and the recognition results tell you who is at which location. Suitable for identity verification in homes and office areas. | 熟人识别分析技能,通过人脸图片比对识别视频/图片中的熟人,支持底库录入,识别结果告诉你哪个位置是谁,适用于家庭、办公区域身份核验"
version: "1.0.27"
license: "MIT-0"
---

# 👥 Acquaintance Recognition & Analysis Skill | 熟人识别分析技能
> **智能分析中枢** · 图片/视频智�

The recognition workflow lacks a privacy warning about sending sensitive facial imagery to an external analysis API.

High
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Although the documentation mentions cloud APIs, it does not clearly warn that local facial imagery is transferred to an external processor or establish informed authorization before that transfer. Home and office footage can expose sensitive biometric information, identities, and locations of people other than the requesting user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The --export-env-only option promises not to run analysis, but supplying it does not prevent face recognition.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The export-only flag is parsed but never checked, so invoking it with a valid media input still reaches face analysis despite promising not to do so. This can cause an unexpected external transfer of sensitive facial imagery, and identity initialization also occurs before any mode-specific handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = JsonUtil.parse(result_json_pure_text, result_json_pure_text)

        result_json_common_ai_response = result_json.get("commonAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_common_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

        result_json_health_ai_response = result_json.get("healthAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_health_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_health_ai_response

Local video contents are passed to the analysis API without disclosure that the file will be uploaded.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The code reads the entire selected local file into a multipart payload and passes it to the analysis API without a visible disclosure or authorization gate. In this skill, that payload can contain biometric imagery and private surveillance footage, making an unexpected upload materially more sensitive than ordinary file processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The documented export-only mode still performs video analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The export-only option is accepted but never consulted, so a valid input still triggers video analysis and potentially an upload. Users relying on the explicit no-analysis promise can unintentionally disclose private home or office footage, while identity initialization also runs regardless of this flag.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

FileUtil.open silently truncates existing files without disclosing the destructive behavior.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Opening the supplied path in mode 'w' immediately erases any existing contents. The generic open helper has no docstring, comment, confirmation, or operation log explaining this destructive behavior; exception tracing does not disclose successful truncation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ordinary HTTP requests can silently register a remote account and persist returned credentials.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

When credentials are unavailable, an ordinary request can automatically invoke remote login with registration enabled, transmit the current identity, and save returned credentials without a separate enrollment decision. This creates an implicit external account and persistent identity linkage; that privacy boundary is especially important for a skill handling face recognition, although this block does not itself transmit images.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 561)May include surrounding context.

python
"source": ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__SKILL_HUB_NAME
            }
            try:
                _response = requests.post(_url, json=_data)
                if _response.status_code == 200:
                    _response_json = _response.json()
                    if _response_json and _response_json.get("success"):

Loading configuration silently creates directories and configuration files, including during module import.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

YamlUtil.load creates parent directories and writes a YAML file when the requested configuration is absent, without a warning, log, or explanatory comment/docstring. BaseEnum.init_subclass invokes this loader during class definition (L044–L059), so merely importing the module can modify the filesystem—an unexpected side effect of configuration loading.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 243)May include surrounding context.

python
username = getattr(model, "username", None)
            if username:
                column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()
                update_data = {key: getattr(model, key) for key in column_names if key != "username"}
                return self.update_by_username(username, **update_data)

            return None

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

python
column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()

            for key in column_names:
                value = getattr(model, key)
                setattr(instance, key, value)

            session.commit()

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 326)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            if offset:
                query = query.offset(offset)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 441)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            return query.scalar()
        finally:

ai_chat documents an OpenClaw agent invocation, but never invokes the agent.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The docstring at L26 explicitly says the method calls the OpenClaw agent through subprocess. However, both command construction and subprocess execution are commented out (L48–L66); the replacement dictionary at L68 causes attribute access at L70 to fail, and the exception handler suppresses the failure, returning None rather than an analysis result or session ID.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
elif isinstance(cur, dict):
                        cur = cur.get(part, default)
                    else:
                        cur = getattr(cur, part)
                return cur
            except Exception:
                return default